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ELIMINATION OF APARTHEID AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC AND NON-RACIAL SOUTH AFRICA

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Forty-ninth year

Report of the Secretary-General on the question of South Africa

CONTENTS

		Paragraphs	Page
I.	INTRODUCTION	1 - 7	3
II.	CONSULTATIONS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE	8 - 34	4
A.	Background	8 - 16	4
B.	Discussions with the Government	17 - 19	6
C.	Discussions with the political parties	20 - 24	6
D.	Discussions with representatives of the transitional institutions	25 - 27	7
E.	Discussions with other intergovernmental observer missions	28	8
F.	Discussions with leaders of the national peace structures, and leading individuals	29 - 31	8
G.	Visit to Harare, Zimbabwe	32	9
H.	Discussions with the diplomatic community in South Africa	33 - 34	9

CONTENTS (continued)

		Paragraphs	Page
III.	ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA	35 - 47	10
	A. Main activities	35 - 36	10
	B. Peace structures	37 - 40	11
	C. Violence	41 - 44	11
	D. Security forces and National Peace-keeping Force	45 - 47	12
IV.	THE ELECTORAL PROCESS	48 - 77	13
	A. The legal framework of the electoral process	48 - 52	13
	B. The framework for observation of the elections	53 - 55	14
	C. An expanded mandate for the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa	56 - 59	15
	D. The operational approach	60 - 67	16
	E. Coordination with other intergovernmental organizations	68 - 73	18
	F. Cooperation with national and foreign non-governmental organizations	74 - 76	19
	G. Trust Fund for Observers from Developing Countries	77	20
V.	RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS	78 - 96	20
	A. Organizational constraints	78	20
	B. Organizational structure and personnel requirements	79 - 85	21
	C. Observers on election day	86 - 93	22
	D. Other resource requirements	94 - 96	24

I. INTRODUCTION

1. It will be recalled that following the Boipatong massacre on 17 June 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 765 (1992) on 16 July by which it, inter alia, invited me to appoint a Special Representative for South Africa in order to recommend, after discussion with the parties in the country, measures which would assist in bringing an effective end to the violence and in creating conditions for negotiations leading towards a peaceful transition to a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa. Immediately after the adoption of the resolution, I appointed Mr. Cyrus R. Vance as my Special Representative for South Africa and he visited the country from 21 to 31 July 1992. On 7 August 1992, I submitted a report to the Security Council on the basis of Mr. Vance's discussions with a wide range of prominent figures and parties in South Africa. 1/

2. After considering my report, the Security Council adopted resolution 772 (1992) on 17 August by which it, inter alia, authorized me to deploy, as a matter of urgency, United Nations observers in South Africa, and invited me to assist in the strengthening of the structures set up under the National Peace Accord. It also invited international organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth and the European Community to consider deploying their own observers in South Africa in coordination with the United Nations and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord.

3. Soon thereafter, the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) was established and the first group of observers arrived in the country in September 1992. By the end of the year, the full complement of the authorized strength of 50 observers was deployed in all the regions of the country. Taking into account the progress in the multi-party negotiations, the Security Council authorized two increases in the number of observers - 10 in February and 40 in September 1993, for a total complement of 100 observers - to serve as a nucleus for the anticipated United Nations role in the electoral process in South Africa.

4. Following consultations with the Government and relevant parties, I designated two Special Envoys, Messrs. Virendra Dayal and Tom Vraalsen, who carried out separate missions to South Africa in September and November/December 1992, respectively, to assist me in the implementation of the two above-mentioned resolutions of the Security Council. On 22 December 1992, I submitted a report to the Council on the findings of my two Special Envoys and on the activities of UNOMSA. 2/

5. On 23 November 1993, the President of the Security Council issued a statement on behalf of the Council in which it welcomed the successful completion of the multi-party negotiating process and the conclusion of agreements reached therein on an interim constitution and electoral bill, and invited me to accelerate contingency planning for a possible United Nations role in the election process in South Africa. 3/ At its first meeting on 7 December 1993, the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) endorsed a resolution that was adopted the previous day by the Multi-Party Negotiating Council (MPNC) requesting, inter alia, the United Nations to provide a sufficient number of

international observers to monitor the electoral process and to coordinate the activities of the international observers provided by OAU, the European Union (EU) and the Commonwealth as well as those provided by Governments. Accordingly, I dispatched a survey team to South Africa on 9 December 1993 to assess the needs of the United Nations in carrying out the requests made to it for electoral assistance.

6. Furthermore, pursuant to Security Council resolutions 765 (1992) and 772 (1992) and taking into account the progress achieved in the peace process including the establishment of TEC on 7 December 1993, I advised the President of the Security Council on 13 December 1993 of my intention to appoint Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria, as my Special Representative for South Africa to assist me in the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions and decisions concerning South Africa and to coordinate the activities of other international observers as requested by TEC. 4/ The President of the Council informed me on 16 December 1993 that the members of the Council agreed with my proposal. 5/ In earlier discussions with me, both Mr. Mandela and Foreign Minister R. F. Botha had welcomed my suggestion to appoint a Special Representative as soon as possible in order to facilitate the peace process.

7. Immediately after his appointment, I requested Mr. Brahimi to visit South Africa for consultations with the parties and the officials of the relevant transitional institutions they have established on the scope and modalities of United Nations involvement in the electoral process in the country. Assisted by a small team from the Secretariat led by Mr. Hisham Omayad, Director in the Department of Political Affairs, Mr. Brahimi visited South Africa from 16 to 23 December 1993. During his stay in Johannesburg, Mr. Brahimi was briefed by the survey team on its findings.

II. CONSULTATIONS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

A. Background

8. In 1989, various parties in South Africa, including the Government and the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), decided to commit themselves to a negotiated political settlement of the conflict in the country. The international community lent its support and encouragement to the commitment made by the parties with the adoption of the Harare Declaration of August 1989 which was endorsed by the General Assembly on 14 December of the same year in its Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (resolution S-16/1).

9. Early in February of 1990, Mr. Nelson Mandela and other prominent political prisoners were released from prison. The Government also announced the unbanning of a number of political organizations including ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the South African Community Party (SACP), and its intention to repeal apartheid and emergency restrictions. During 1990 and 1991, discriminatory legislation, particularly that constituting the "pillars of apartheid" - the Land Acts, Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act - was repealed.

10. Soon after the release of Mr. Mandela, bilateral talks between the Government and ANC led to two preliminary agreements: the Groote Schuur Minute of 4 May 1990 (A/45/268, annex), by which the two parties agreed on a common commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence as well as to stability, and to a peaceful process of negotiations; and the Pretoria Minute of 6 August 1990 by which ANC announced the suspension of all armed action with immediate effect.

11. Formal negotiations on constitutional reform began in December 1991 with the establishment of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I). Despite the positive atmosphere of the talks and the progress made in some areas, agreement on the crucial issue of a new constitutional dispensation eluded the parties. The following May, the parties made another attempt at CODESA II. However, the Boipatong massacre prompted ANC to suspend its participation in the talks until the Government took more decisive action to put a halt to the violence in the townships.

12. Despite the breakdown of the CODESA process, the Government and ANC continued informal contacts which led to the signing on 26 September 1992 of a Record of Understanding, by which the Government agreed to a number of the conditions put forward by ANC for returning to the negotiations. Further bilateral talks resulted, on 5 March 1993, in a number of informal understandings which made possible the convening of a new conference with broader representation than at CODESA - the Multi-Party Negotiating Council (MPNC).

13. After protracted and difficult negotiations, MPNC adopted on 18 November 1993 a number of constitutional principles and institutions which would guide South Africa during a transitional period lasting until 27 April 1999. They included the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), the Interim Constitution, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the Independent Media Commission (IMC) and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA). TEC will remain in existence until the entry into force of the interim constitution on 27 April 1994.

14. The main objective of TEC is to facilitate, in conjunction with all existing legislative and executive governmental structures at national, regional and local levels, the transition to, and preparation for, the implementation of a democratic system of Government in South Africa by the holding of free and fair elections for a Parliament which will consist of a 400-member National Assembly and a 90-member Senate. The joint sitting of the Assembly and the Senate will form the Constitutional Assembly whose main task would be to draft during the first two years of the transition period, by acting as a Constituent Assembly, a final constitution for the country. The interim constitution stipulates that the future South Africa will be divided into nine provinces, each of which will have a provincial legislature, government and executive council.

15. The Head of State will be an Executive President who will be chosen by the governing party. The Cabinet will be composed of, on the basis of the principle of proportional representation, those political parties that will obtain 5 per cent or more of the vote in the elections. Decisions in the Cabinet will

be taken by consensus, in a manner which will give consideration to the spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity as well as the need for the effective administration of the country.

16. The future Constitutional Court of South Africa will have the final jurisdiction regarding matters pertaining to the interpretation, protection and enforcement of the interim constitution at all levels of government. A decision by the Constitutional Court will be final and binding.

B. Discussions with the Government

17. My Special Representative met with President F. W. de Klerk in Cape Town and with Foreign Minister R. F. Botha in Johannesburg on 17 December and 23 December 1993, respectively. The President noted that South Africa was capable of and had extensive experience in organizing and conducting elections. He said that the electoral process would be complicated for most of the electorate, and national and international assistance in voter education would be welcomed.

18. Both the President and the Foreign Minister stressed that the most difficult problem facing the transition process was political violence and intimidation. They also noted that the United Nations has contributed appreciably through UNOMSA to the efforts to curb such violence and to encourage dialogue and tolerance. In the process, the United Nations has succeeded in establishing its credibility and objectivity among the South African population at large. They stressed the historical importance of the elections and the critical need for the electoral process and its outcome to be, and seen to be, both free and fair as well as legitimate.

19. The President stated that the transitional arrangements were resilient institutions and enjoyed substantial influence and authority to facilitate a successful outcome of the peace process. The State President and the Foreign Minister shared the view that international support for and assistance to the transitional structures would enhance their prestige and ability to contribute positively to the peace process. In this regard, the Minister expressed the hope that the United Nations would allocate resources to provide the largest possible number of observers needed to do the job.

C. Discussions with the political parties

20. My Special Representative met with Mr. Nelson Mandela, President of ANC, in Johannesburg on 18 December 1993. Mr. Mandela said that he and President de Klerk were coordinating their efforts to bring the members of the Freedom Alliance - the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Conservative Party (CP), the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF) and the homelands of Ciskei and Bophuthatswana - to the peace process, and expressed cautious optimism that most - if not all - of them would eventually cooperate and agree to participate in the elections. He noted that the groups which had the potential to disrupt the electoral process were those that enjoyed support within the military police and security forces as well as within the bureaucracy. Mr. Mandela stressed that it was

important for the United Nations to maintain lines of communication open with the Freedom Alliance and urged my Special Representative to meet with them during his visit to the country.

21. My Special Representative had actually asked to see all political leaders but appointments could not be arranged with some of them because of the holiday season. Chief Buthelezi suggested a meeting on Tuesday, 21 December. However my Special Representative was in Harare, Zimbabwe, on that day and he asked to meet the leader of IFP as early as possible in the New Year.

22. Mr. Mandela recognized the positive contributions made by UNOMSA to the peace process and called for a strong United Nations presence during the electoral process. In his view, if the resources were available, the United Nations should consider deploying a large number of observers - no less than 5,000 - in support of the efforts deployed by the people of South Africa to ensure that the elections were free and fair.

23. My Special Representative also met with the leader of the Democratic Party, Mr. Zach de Beer, in Johannesburg on 23 December 1993. The discussion centred on the arrangements for the elections and on the role that the United Nations could play in support of the electoral process. Mr. de Beer observed that the interim constitution and the other transitional arrangements enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of South Africans. He noted that the more observers the United Nations could deploy, the better.

24. It should be noted that, before leaving New York, my Special Representative had met with Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Chairman of ANC, as well as with Mr. Benny Alexander, Secretary-General of PAC. While in Harare, he met with Mr. Johnson P. Mlambo and Mr. Gora Ibrahim, respectively First Deputy President and Foreign Secretary of PAC, who explained that their party will participate in the elections but was not, for the moment, willing to be represented on TEC.

D. Discussions with representatives of the transitional institutions

25. While he was in Cape Town on 17 December 1993, my Special Representative met with Mr. Zam Titus, Co-Chairperson of TEC. On 23 December 1993, he met in Johannesburg with a delegation of the newly appointed Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) led by its Chairman, Judge J. C. Kriegler, and including the Rev. Frank Chikane and Mr. C. Nupen, members of IEC and Dr. R. Mokate, Chief Executive Officer of IEC.

26. With both Messrs. Titus and Kriegler, my Special Representative exchanged views on the responsibilities entrusted to TEC and IEC with respect to the electoral process and as to how best the United Nations could assist them in that regard. It was recognized that the relationship between the United Nations and the two structures would need to be further discussed and clarified.

27. Judge Kriegler emphasized that IEC was determined to meet the deadline of 27 April 1994 for holding the elections. IEC would like to know as soon as possible the programmes of assistance to the electoral process planned by the

United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations, particularly regarding voter education and election monitoring. Early coordination and liaison between IEC and the United Nations will help achieve the common objective of facilitating a successful electoral process. He said that United Nations assistance would be needed to conduct polling in foreign countries where South Africa did not have political representation and noted that IEC would welcome United Nations expertise and assistance on the technical aspects of monitoring.

E. Discussions with other intergovernmental observer missions

28. During his stay in Johannesburg, my Special Representative also met on 18 December 1993 with the Head of the OAU Observer Mission in South Africa, Ambassador Legwaila J. Legwaila, and with a team of the Commonwealth Observer Mission in South Africa (COMSA) led by Mr. John Syson, Senior Adviser for southern Africa. The discussions with both missions centred around the existing cooperation between them and UNOMSA and how this could be further strengthened and broadened in connection with the electoral process. They exchanged preliminary ideas about the planned expansion in the size of each mission and how best they can coordinate their activities with a view to their future coordination in the deployment and training of observers.

F. Discussions with leaders of the national peace structures, and leading individuals

29. On 17 December 1993, my Special Representative met in Cape Town with Archbishop Desmond Tutu and with Justice Richard Goldstone, Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into Public Violence and Intimidation. Archbishop Tutu, who had recently met with Chief Buthelezi and talked to Mr. Mandela and other leaders, apprised my Special Representative about the efforts being made to convince all parties to participate in the electoral process. Despite the decision of the Freedom Alliance not to participate in the electoral process and the violence in the East Rand and Natal/KwaZulu, Archbishop Tutu was optimistic that the transitional arrangements would succeed.

30. Justice Goldstone stressed that intimidation and violence remained the most difficult challenge to the peace process. He said he might seek United Nations expert assistance for the investigative unit of his Commission. My Special Representative observed that personnel with police background could be included in the United Nations Mission to respond to such needs.

31. On 22 December 1993, my Special Representative met in Johannesburg with Mr. John Hall and Dr. Antonie Gildenhuys, Chairpersons of the National Peace Committee and its Secretariat, respectively. The role that the two bodies would play in the electoral process and the cooperation between them and UNOMSA was discussed. Dr. Gildenhuys informed my Special Representative that the various regional and local peace committees will continue to be involved in promoting peace but will not observe the electoral process. Since all relevant parties in South Africa, including some which are not participating in the multi-party talks, are members of the committees, the Secretariat cannot pass judgement on

the electoral process or its outcome. The most useful contribution it can make is to continue to promote peace and dialogue among all the parties.

G. Visit to Harare, Zimbabwe

32. In response to an invitation by the Government of Zimbabwe, my Special Representative visited Harare to attend the Summit Meeting of the Front-line States which took place on 20 December 1993. President Mugabe, who holds the chairmanship of this group, expressed his satisfaction at the positive developments which had taken place on the South African scene. He appealed to all parties to cease acts of violence so that the elections of 27 April 1994 could take place in favourable conditions. In this connection, the Conference welcomed the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General and stressed the positive role which the United Nations should play to ensure the success of the electoral process in South Africa. The participants in the Conference emphasized, in particular, the importance for the United Nations to mobilize a large number of observers (President Mugabe mentioned a figure of 7,000) to cover the elections in South Africa.

H. Discussions with the diplomatic community in South Africa

33. During his visit to South Africa, my Special Representative had occasion to meet with Mr. Peter Bruckner, Ambassador of Denmark and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps; Mr. Princeton Lyman, Sir Anthony Reeve and Mr. Marc Brault, Ambassadors of the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Canada, respectively; and with a group of African heads of mission in South Africa led by Ambassador William Khoza of Malawi. All his interlocutors welcomed the involvement of the United Nations in the electoral process in South Africa and noted that it would have a salutary effect both on the process and its outcome. They also recognized the positive contributions of UNOMSA to the transitional process in South Africa and to the efforts to curb violence.

34. There was a meeting of minds among the diplomatic community on the need for as close cooperation and coordination as possible between the United Nations on the one hand and EU, OAU and the Commonwealth on the other. All ambassadors stressed that the United Nations must have adequate observers to cover fully the electoral process and to ensure the success of the transition period. Some ambassadors cited the figure of 2,000 as a rough estimate of United Nations observers that would be needed. Others asked whether 2,000 or even 3,000 observers would be enough, considering the violence, and the tensions which existed between security forces and large sections of the population, and given that up to 9,000 voting stations would be opened on election day. Many diplomats underlined the importance of providing common training to all international observers in order to avoid - or at least limit - confusion and disagreement. All ambassadors spoke of the importance of the success of the peace process in South Africa for Africa and the world. They also stressed the importance of voter education and saw a role for the United Nations in that regard.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. Main activities

35. UNOMSA continued to carry out its tasks in all regions and at both regional and local levels. In this context, the Chief of Mission held a series of meetings with a cross-section of political, church and community leaders including President de Klerk, Mr. Mandela and Chief Buthelezi, Mr. Clarence Makwetu, President of the PAC, General Constand Viljoen, leader of AVF and Professor Mosala, President of the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), to discuss a range of issues related to the peace process, and in particular the question of political violence and developments in the multi-party negotiations. Pursuant to the recommendations of the Secretary-General in December 1992 2/ and September 1993 6/ and their approval by the Security Council in February and October 1993, 7/ additional observers are to be deployed, bringing the total to 100 early in 1994. This expanded group will serve also as the nucleus for the activities of UNOMSA in the South African electoral process.

36. Among the main events covered and activities undertaken by UNOMSA observers in this period were:

(a) Demonstrations, marches, rallies, funerals and other forms of mass action. UNOMSA observers worked closely with organizers and the security forces to ensure that events were adequately planned and that the Goldstone Commission guidelines for marches and political gatherings were complied with. Observers also held 832 informal bilateral meetings and often acted as channels of communication between groups across the political and social spectrum, including officials of the Government and security forces, political parties and non-governmental organizations which are actively involved in the peace process;

(b) Meetings of local and regional peace committee and other structures established under the National Peace Accord to whose activities full support was given. In the past six months alone, UNOMSA has been represented at about 1,320 meetings of the peace structures. In total, UNOMSA observers have attended well over 9,000 meetings and events throughout the country in the 15 months during which the Mission has been in South Africa;

(c) The Goldstone Commission hearings at which a UNOMSA jurist continued to play a role as an objective commentator on the Commission's modus operandi and balance;

(d) Serving as a channel of communication and coordination among international observer missions. This role has contributed to enhancing the effectiveness and harmonizing the activities of the OAU, Commonwealth and European Union observer missions and has been reinforced by the recent call of the Transitional Executive Council on the United Nations to coordinate the activities of all international observers in South Africa.

B. Peace structures

37. The structures established under the National Peace Accord have all been functioning at national, regional and local levels, with the number of peace committees going from 50 to about 200 in the past six months. The performance of the structures has been far from uniform. In most cases, the lack of agreement between political parties on the measures to be taken or their failure to implement decisions agreed upon have been the major causes for the ineffectiveness of many of the peace structures. Furthermore, most peace committees continue to suffer from budgetary constraints, lack of competent and committed staff as well as absence of political commitment on the part of major role players, including the police and security forces.

38. The Goldstone Commission, one of the most credible institutions in South Africa in terms of its contribution for peaceful transition towards democracy and non-racialism, has recently issued some important findings.

39. With regard to the vital area of socio-economic reconstruction and development (SERD), concerted efforts have been exerted in various regions to establish regional and local SERD committees and appoint regional coordinators, notably in the Wits/Vaal, Northern Transvaal and the Natal/KwaZulu regions. However, these evolving SERD structures are still ill equipped to mobilize resources, especially in terms of generating local interests and political support for project formulation, planning and implementation and in identifying appropriate sources of funding. The lack of technical expertise, the lengthy bureaucratic procedures for appointing SERD coordinators, the absence of clear criteria for funding mechanisms, the seemingly low priority of socio-economic development on the current political agenda of different groups and, most importantly, the scarcity of funds for development, have all contributed to the quasi-stagnation of development activities at the regional and local levels.

40. UNOMSA has been called upon to play a more pro-active role in the SERD process, regionally and locally, in view of the diversified pool of expertise available to it. The international observers will thus share in their research, documentation and knowledge, bringing in relevant experience in development from other areas. This is a crucial step forward for the international observers, as it paves the way for technical assistance and the whole array of development activities already pledged to the new South Africa.

C. Violence

41. The major area of concern still remains that of public violence attributed mostly to conflict between political parties, taxi associations and between township and hostel residents. Criminal elements, often victims of social deprivation and unemployment, especially among the youth, contribute to a significant extent to the perpetuation of violence. In many instances, they receive protection from political groups or disappear in the anonymity or complicity of the township population.

42. Political violence continues to be mainly concentrated in Natal and the East Rand, mostly in the townships of Katlehong and Thokoza. According to the

Human Rights Commission, 2,768 people have died in political violence between the beginning of June and the end of November 1993, an increase of 46 per cent over the same period last year. The East Rand and Natal together have accounted for approximately 90 per cent of the death toll. In the East Rand alone, 1,299 people have died as a result of political violence during the period. This represents 54 per cent of the total number of victims in the country and 87 per cent of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Veereeniging (PWV) region. According to the reports from the Human Rights Commission, the month of July, during which the date for the election was announced, was the highest for the past three years with 581 deaths, followed by the month of August with 554. Since then the number of deaths has decreased slightly but violence in the affected areas has not been brought under control, despite the efforts of the peace structures and the international observers.

43. Right-wing violence is also on the increase. On 25 June, right-wingers armed with guns, many of them members of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement, Afrikaanse Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), forcibly broke into and occupied the World Trade Centre, where multi-party negotiations were taking place. Many have appeared in the Magistrate's Court and have been charged with trespassing. On 13 December, in a gruesome racist attack in Randfontein, on the West Rand of the PWV, white men in camouflage uniform forced two cars off the road and shot their black occupants, killing three people and injuring four others.

44. The increased violence in the East Rand and Natal has coincided with the collapse or at least the paralysis of the peace structures in the areas. While numerous initiatives have been undertaken to curb violence, the overall result is far from reassuring. However, in circumstances where joint action was taken by political parties and the police, tangible results were often achieved. Initiatives to prevent violence around hostels in the Wits/Vaal area have also been undertaken by church leaders as well as hostel and township residents. The newly created National Youth Development Forum and the Peace Corps project of the Wits/Vaal Peace Secretariat are efforts being undertaken to engage young people in meaningful and productive activities and thereby reduce their criminal activities. With regard to taxi violence, mediation by peace structures has helped to mitigate the worst excesses of taxi wars, but long-term changes are required to end taxi violence. UNOMSA teams have played a major role in the resolution of similar problems in Border/Ciskei and Western Cape.

D. Security forces and National Peace-keeping Force

45. In the absence of hard evidence as to causes, the paralysis in law enforcement tends to be explained in terms of collusion or indifference on the part of the security forces, or the involvement of a "third force" or an unknown number of covert forces in the more systematic acts of violence. The Goldstone Commission has investigated several specific allegations of this type and, except for some members of the KwaZulu police, has found no conclusive evidence in support. Nevertheless, the average citizen tends to believe otherwise. Consequently a cloud of suspicion and hostility continues to hang over the security services, particularly in the townships, as a result of a general dissatisfaction with their performance and their previous role as enforcers of apartheid.

46. A national peace-keeping force for the maintenance of peace and public order in the electioneering period has been proposed. Though the task of establishing the National Peace-keeping Force has been entrusted to the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) through its Subcouncil on Defence and some ideas on the modalities have been put forward, the prospect of such a Force coming into being effectively before the elections is remote. As a result, the task of maintaining law and order would remain the responsibility of the current security forces. The Internal Stability Unit, whose reform in line with community policing and incorporation into the police force is being considered by TEC, remains a controversial body and its removal from some townships is still being demanded. Though much remains to be done, the security forces and the Minister of Law and Order have started to respond to the demands of the community and dictates of changing situations. Of signal importance is the recent call for technical assistance from the international community and the willingness not to declare "unrest areas" without consultations with the communities and peace structures concerned.

47. The establishment of the National Peace-keeping Force should be distinguished from the long-term issue of the integration of armed formations. One of the tasks entrusted to the Subcouncil on Defence is to oversee the planning, preparation and training of a future National Defence Force. The Multi-party Forum agreed on an integrated force to be known as the National Defence Force, consisting of the current South African Defence Force (SADF), the defence forces of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) states, and other armed formations. This is an area of concern cited under resolution 772 (1992) where major progress has been made in the fourth quarter instanced by regular meetings between SADF and the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK Spear of the Nation) leadership, joined more recently by officials of Ciskei, Venda, Transkei and the Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA).

IV. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

A. The legal framework of the electoral process

48. The legal framework of the electoral process is defined by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Acts, the Independent Media Commission Act and the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act. These four Acts are the product of lengthy discussions and were approved by consensus. They provide a legitimate framework for the conduct of free and fair elections, and many of their provisions are quite innovative. The recent appointments to the Independent Electoral Commission are a further reassurance of good faith and cooperation on all sides.

49. As formal preparations for the elections now get under way, several concerns should be noted. Owing to the delay in the establishment of the electoral structures, the elections will be organized under significant time pressures. The limited lead time is particularly critical with regard to the issuance of voter documentation (whether identity cards or the voter identification cards envisioned in the Electoral Act). Approximately 4 million eligible voters are currently without enabling documentation, 2 million of them residents of the TBVC states. There is no doubt that IEC will do all it can to

ensure that all eligible voters willing to obtain the necessary documentation will be able to do so in time and without unnecessarily cumbersome procedures.

50. A second concern is voter education. At present, only a few non-governmental organizations are providing quality non-partisan voter education. Experience has shown that the most important element in a free and fair election is an informed voting public. The Independent Electoral Commission should reinforce the voter education campaign and emphasize three crucial components: the secrecy of the vote, the need for political tolerance and the mechanics of voting, including the procedure for obtaining enabling documentation.

51. The third main concern is the spread of violence and the need for impartiality in election-related police actions. There is a great need for measures that will increase the public accountability of the police and promote meaningful community involvement - factors essential to the effectiveness of the police in serving the public. This is all the more important as it is unlikely that the National Peace-keeping Force will come into being before the elections.

52. Finally, the transparency and fairness of the appointment procedures for electoral officials at all levels will have a clear impact on the perceived legitimacy of the elections. Adequate appointment procedures will supplement the detailed provisions of the Electoral Law in ensuring the full confidence of the public in their electoral institutions.

B. The framework for observation of the elections

53. The Independent Electoral Commission Act defines two categories of observers: international observers and domestic monitors. International observers are defined as the accredited representatives of intergovernmental organizations or foreign Governments. Monitors are appointed electoral officers who will observe different aspects of the electoral process and report to the Chief Director of the IEC Monitoring Directorate on any irregularities. The Monitoring Directorate will operate under the direct supervision of IEC. Additional definitions are provided by the Electoral Act, which specifies the powers, duties and functions of party election and voting agents.

54. At present, there are no detailed regulations or guidelines for international observers. As soon as the Monitoring Directorate is established, it will be expected to register observers and regulate their activities, publish guidelines and, eventually, prepare a Code of Conduct for international observers which will be binding. Once the guidelines have been prepared, the Directorate will probably consider similar arrangements with regard to observers from national and international non-governmental organizations.

55. One of the closing acts of the Multi-Party Negotiating Council, ratified by the Management Committee of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) at its first session, was to request the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the European Community and the Organization of African Unity as well as individual foreign Governments to provide a sufficient number of international observers to oversee the electoral process. On 1 December 1993, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of

South Africa wrote me a letter suggesting that immediate consideration be given to advance planning in order to ensure that the United Nations would be in a position to mount an effective operation when IEC or TEC became operational.

C. An expanded mandate for the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa

56. In response to the above request, I would propose that the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) be expanded to include the observation of the elections scheduled for 27 April 1994. In this new context, UNOMSA would have a significant role not only in assessing the ultimate freedom and fairness of the elections, but in monitoring the electoral process at each stage. Based on its long-term activities, UNOMSA would be uniquely capable of evaluating the extent to which the April elections truly reflect the will of the South African people.

57. Under the proposed expanded mandate, UNOMSA would be required to:

(a) Observe the actions of the Independent Electoral Commission and its organs in all aspects and stages of the electoral process, verifying their compatibility with the conduct of a free and fair election under the Independent Electoral Commission and Electoral Acts;

(b) Observe the extent of freedom of organization, movement, assembly and expression during the electoral campaign and ascertain the adequacy of the measures taken to ensure that political parties and alliances enjoy those freedoms without hindrance or intimidation;

(c) Monitor the compliance of the security forces with the requirements of the relevant laws and the decisions of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC);

(d) Verify the satisfactory implementation of the dispositions of the Independent Media Commission and the Independent Broadcasting Authority Acts;

(e) Verify that the voter education efforts of the electoral authorities and other interested parties are sufficient and will result in voters being adequately informed on both the meaning of the vote and its procedural aspects;

(f) Verify that qualified voters are not denied the identification documents or temporary voter's cards that will enable them to exercise their right to vote;

(g) Verify that voting occurs on election days in an environment free of intimidation and in conditions which ensure free access to voting stations and the secrecy of the vote; and verify that adequate measures have been taken to ensure proper transport and custody of ballots, security of the vote count and timely announcement of results;

(h) Coordinate the activities of observers from international governmental organizations and foreign Governments so as to ensure that they are deployed in an effective and coordinated manner; establish effective cooperation with South

African and foreign non-governmental organizations, which will also monitor the electoral process.

58. Based on the above activities, UNOMSA will report to the electoral authorities on complaints, irregularities and interferences reported or observed, and, as appropriate, will request the electoral authorities to take remedial action. UNOMSA will be expected to prepare all of its reports on the basis of factual information about the conduct of the elections. UNOMSA will establish a direct relationship with the Independent Electoral Commission and make constructive suggestions and comments as appropriate in order to contribute to the success of each stage of the electoral process.

59. UNOMSA will also prepare periodic reports on the evolution of the electoral process which will be submitted to the Secretary-General through his Special Representative.

D. The operational approach

60. In order to define the operational approach for the observation, it is important to note the difference between the observation of the electoral campaign and the observation of a specific polling day. The difference is particularly important in the case of UNOMSA, since many of the electoral campaign observation activities will be similar to those already undertaken within the current mandate. UNOMSA has been observing "demonstrations, marches and other forms of mass action, noting the conduct of all parties, and endeavouring to obtain information indicating the degree to which the parties' actions are consistent with the principles of the National Peace Accord and the Goldstone Commission guidelines for marches and political gatherings". 8/

61. During the two/three months preceding the elections, the focus of this original UNOMSA activity will change and become more closely related to the electoral process. The network of contacts established by UNOMSA will expand to include new electoral actors. The framework for evaluating the incidents observed will be the guidelines and regulations issued by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) rather than the National Peace Accord and Goldstone Commission guidelines. UNOMSA will continue to cooperate with the structures established under the National Peace Accord, whose activities will also increasingly concentrate on the electoral process. In this context, the violence-monitoring activities of UNOMSA are almost indistinguishable from the campaign observation activities contained in the electoral mandate suggested above.

62. The current UNOMSA mandate does not, however, cover a variety of activities that are essential for adequate electoral campaign coverage. These must therefore be added. These activities include: observation of IEC activities and of dispositions relating to the media; verification of the adequacy of voter education efforts; verification that qualified voters are not denied the identification documents or temporary voter's cards that will enable them to vote; and new responsibilities related to coordination. Furthermore, since a very large increase in the volume and intensity of events can be anticipated, arrangements must be made now to ensure sufficient resources for the mission.

63. In contrast to campaign observation, polling day observation is qualitatively and quantitatively different. While the electoral campaign as a whole may include thousands of demonstrations and marches, it is unlikely that more than a few hundred will take place on any given day. This will be the general pattern for most of the electoral events observed during the campaign period. In contrast, events to be observed on polling day will take place simultaneously at 10,000 different polling stations. While the events of an electoral campaign are usually heterogeneous and have a high emotional content, polling day events tend to be the opposite. They are highly mechanical, repetitive and predictable, since the electoral authorities will clearly establish each step in the voting procedure. Furthermore, the incidence of violence and intimidation is unlikely to decrease.

64. As a result, polling day observation requires a much larger number of observers, who will perform a simpler task. Previous United Nations electoral missions have followed two different approaches regarding voting day observers. In cases where the number of polling stations was small (as in Namibia) or where a large number of polling stations is concentrated in a few polling centres (as in El Salvador), it has been possible to deploy at least one observer to each polling centre, thus maintaining a continuous presence at all times. However, this approach has not been feasible in cases where there has been a large number of dispersed polling stations (as in Nicaragua, Haiti, Angola or Eritrea). In those cases, mobile teams were used to visit several polling stations each. The homogenous character of the activities to be observed allows the systematic use of statistical samples and random visits with very effective results.

65. The presence of national monitors is not essential to the first approach, since international observers are present everywhere. With the second approach, however, the presence of national monitors at every polling station is a necessary precondition for an effective operation. In such cases, national monitors constitute a first line of observation, providing information on irregularities to the international observers when they visit the polling stations. The mutual controls implicit in the presence of monitors representing competing parties and/or independent non-governmental organizations will facilitate cross-verification of the information received. As the international observers will be expected to visit each polling station more than once, the direct and indirect information thus collected will be sufficient for a very detailed evaluation of the events on polling days.

66. The case of South Africa presents special considerations. There will be a very large number of polling stations (about 10,000), and distances to be travelled in the rural areas are considerable. Violence is concentrated in a few limited areas, with the Natal/KwaZulu and Wits/Vaal regions accounting for a very large percentage. The participation of national monitors is expected to be significant. Several parties will be able to place one monitor in each of the polling stations, and non-governmental organizations interested in the electoral process are forming their own observer network.

67. Therefore, the operational approach for election day observation suggested for South Africa is a combination of the two approaches used in previous missions. Observation will be conducted by mobile teams in those areas of the country where expectations of violence are low. The number of polling stations

monitored by an observer team will vary. In rural districts, an observation team will be able to visit 4 to 10 polling stations per polling day depending on local conditions. In urban areas, each observation team will observe 14 to 20 polling stations per polling day. However, in districts with a history of violence, one observer will be assigned to each polling station.

E. Coordination with other intergovernmental organizations

68. The resolution adopted by the Negotiating Council on 6 December 1993 and ratified by the Transitional Executive Council calls upon the United Nations to coordinate all international observers as defined in the Independent Electoral Commission Act and, as a matter of urgency, to put in place the necessary arrangements to that effect, in particular ensuring that the international observers are deployed in an effective and coordinated manner in close cooperation with IEC. The Independent Electoral Commission Act defines an international observer as "any person appointed as a representative of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the European Community, the Commonwealth or any other intergovernmental organization or foreign Government accredited for that purpose by the Subcouncil on Foreign Affairs of the Transitional Council in consultation with the Department of Foreign Affairs, in order to observe and to report on the electoral process".

69. All of the intergovernmental organizations specifically mentioned in the Independent Electoral Commission Act have already deployed observers in South Africa and plan to expand their number in the near future. The Organization of African Unity currently has 13 observers working with the National Peace Accord structures and plans a gradual increase to 50 observers in early April. The European Union now has 17 observers monitoring public violence. It plans a separate group of up to 322 observers by the election date. The Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa (COMSA) presently comprises 20 observers. For the elections the Commonwealth will organize a Commonwealth Observer Group (COGSA) comprising a total of 70 senior observers beginning in early April. All three organizations have expressed their support for a United Nations role as the coordinator of international electoral observation efforts.

70. Several Governments have expressed interest in sending observers in addition to those to be provided by the missions organized by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the European Union or the Commonwealth and in having them included under the United Nations coordination umbrella. Although a sizeable number of such observers is expected to join the international effort, precise numbers are not yet available.

71. Effective coordination must go beyond the simple exchange of information. I would suggest the creation of a Coordinating Committee, comprising the chiefs of the four major missions present for the observation. Given the special responsibility assigned to the United Nations, my Special Representative or the Chief of Mission will act as its Chairperson. The Committee should provide overall political leadership for the common efforts and assume responsibility for the joint statement after the elections. Under the Committee there should be a Technical Task Force comprising the four Chief Electoral Officers of the four missions, chaired by the Head of the Electoral Division of UNOMSA, with the

function of overseeing the activities of a Joint Operations Unit that will also be responsible for establishing cooperation links with the non-governmental organizations that send observer delegations. The Secretary of the Technical Task Force, an officer appointed by the United Nations, will head the Joint Operations Unit.

72. The Joint Operations Unit will concentrate on preparing the deployment of the large number of additional observers who will arrive for election day. This will require a substantial amount of preparatory work, including problem-solving related to transportation, communications and accommodation of the additional observers; the compilation of information for each of the small areas in which each of the observer teams will be working; organization of their deployment, which will include a sojourn of two to three days in their respective areas so that they can get acquainted with local conditions as well as with the electoral authorities and political representatives; the preparation of a manual, guidelines and training programmes; and the organization of observer arrival and departure. However, the initial attention of the Joint Operations Unit will be devoted to building on the informal coordination arrangements already established by UNOMSA in collaboration with the other three missions, developing common forms for the observation of events such as mass demonstrations, and organizing the databanks where information collected by the observers will be systematically recorded and maintained for the use of all four missions.

73. The proposed coordination will include the preparation of a joint statement after the election which will reflect the consensual opinion of the four missions in relation to the electoral process. Following standard practice, it is expected that each mission will prepare an independent, detailed report to its respective mandating organ. However, it must be noted that the primary responsibility for the verification of the elections as free and fair rests with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).

F. Cooperation with national and foreign non-governmental organizations

74. The resolution of the Transitional Executive Council regarding the participation of international observers also expressed "the hope that all international observers and other observers from South African and foreign non-governmental organizations would cooperate closely in the performance of their task to oversee the electoral process at all stages". Given the interest shown to date in the situation in South Africa, one can anticipate a very large involvement of foreign non-governmental organizations in the forthcoming elections. In many cases, such involvement will consist of support to South African organizations for voter education and training and organization of monitor networks and other election-related activities.

75. Although foreign non-governmental organization observers will be present during the campaign period, their presence will increase significantly in the two weeks prior to the elections. However, their numbers, together with the variety of their sponsoring organizations, will prevent them from coordinating their observation in the systematic manner being planned for international governmental organizations and foreign government delegations. Nevertheless,

efforts will be made to establish a cooperative relationship with the foreign non-governmental organizations, as they will contribute to the overall impact of the international observer presence. Cooperation might include the sharing of background materials, briefings and coordinated deployments.

76. Efforts will also be made to establish working relationships with national non-governmental entities involved in various aspects of the elections such as civic education and the organization of domestic monitoring networks. Several national non-governmental organizations are currently organizing a network of independent monitors in order to integrate their efforts. Since the presence of domestic monitors at every polling station is critical to the overall success of the observation, the international observer teams will seek to establish direct contact with the national monitors in polling stations throughout their assigned areas.

G. Trust Fund for Observers from Developing Countries

77. Most of the Member States that are sending observers are industrialized societies. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the foreign non-governmental organizations that will participate in the process are headquartered in those countries. On the other hand, many developing countries, although deeply interested in the situation in South Africa, do not have the resources to send their own observers. Even if the geographical distribution of the observers funded from the United Nations budget is more balanced, an overrepresentation of observers from Western, industrialized societies can be expected. I will set up a special Trust Fund to finance the participation of additional observers from African and developing countries, and I hope that some Member States will be willing to make voluntary contributions to this Fund.

V. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

A. Organizational constraints

78. The election has been scheduled for 27 April 1994. The time remaining to establish an efficient support system is therefore extremely short and significantly limits the range of otherwise viable options. As a result, the operational plan for the expanded mission must be formulated on the basis of what can realistically be accomplished in the time-frame available. This applies to the calculation of the number of observers that can be selected and dispatched to UNOMSA in time to follow the electoral campaign; the overall number of observers that can be fielded to monitor the actual elections (considering relevant logistical support limitations on site); the type of communications network that can be established; and the manner in which additional resources such as vehicles and other relevant equipment can be made available to the observers in due time. Furthermore, only a limited amount of preparatory work can actually commence immediately, and many of the necessary financial commitments can only be undertaken once the revised mission budget is approved.

B. Organizational structure and personnel requirements

79. Under the expanded mandate of UNOMSA, the Mission will be headed by my Special Representative, supported by a Deputy Special Representative and assisted by a Senior Advisory Committee comprised of distinguished personalities, which will meet as required, and supported by a small unit comprised of two Senior Advisers, four Professional staff and support staff. The current and future work of UNOMSA will be fully integrated.

80. UNOMSA will have two operating arms: a Peace Promotion Division and an Electoral Division. The Peace Promotion Division will be headed by a D-2 reporting to the Deputy Special Representative. The work of the nine Regional Offices will be coordinated by that Division, and its teams will continue to follow rallies and other public events, investigate instances of intimidation and related complaints, continue to coordinate with the peace structures, and will expand its network of contacts to include the monitoring branch of the IEC.

81. The Director in charge of the Peace Promotion Division will be supported by three Area Coordinators at the D-1 level. There will also be nine Regional Coordinators for the Northern Cape, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu/Natal, Orange Free State, Northwest, Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV), Northern Transvaal and Eastern Transvaal regions. To cope with the expected large increase in the volume of activities to be monitored by the Division, it is proposed that the present 50 observers now being increased to 100 by the end of January should be further increased to 500 by March 1994. This will allow the monitoring teams to increase their coverage in terms of number of events, geographical spread and political complexity and intimidation.

82. The Electoral Division will also be headed by a Director at the D-2 level who will report to the Deputy Special Representative. The Director will be supported by a Deputy Director responsible for logistic matters at the D-1 level. There will be three other areas: electoral, voter education and media - as well as a small complement of statistical and research officers. Two electoral officers, both with electoral/voter education backgrounds, will be posted in each region. Although all personnel in each region will be under the coordination and guidance of the regional coordinators, the electoral specialists will maintain a functional liaison with the Electoral Division at headquarters at Johannesburg.

83. Considering the substantial expansion of the mandate of the Mission, with the resulting enlargement of its substantive staff, the administrative component of UNOMSA must be augmented significantly. In order to ensure that adequate logistical support for the observers is provided in a timely manner, a Chief Administrative Officer must be appointed to head the Administrative Service, including Personnel, Finance, Procurement, Transport, Communications and General Services. The strength of international staff of the service will gradually expand from the currently authorized level of 14, which includes clerical staff, to an election period total of 50 people of various ranks, plus one Senior Administrative Officer assigned to each regional office. Approximately 300 local staff, including drivers and interpreters, would be required on at least a part-time basis by February and an additional 700 for the last phase.

84. The organizational structure outlined in the previous paragraphs should be fully in place by the end of February. It is expected that OAU, EU and the Commonwealth will have 15, 150 and 20 observers respectively by that date. During March, UNOMSA will have incrementally increased by 200 observers each month, so as to cover the increased number of public mass activities that will take place in the last phase of the electoral campaign and to help to prepare the ground for election-day observers. OAU and EU will increase their numbers by 15 and 50 respectively, and the Commonwealth will maintain its previous strength.

85. The Joint Operations Unit (see paras. 71 and 72 above) will be comprised of one liaison officer from OAU, EU and the Commonwealth, with a small complement of three computer programmer assistants, one demographer and one cartographer. A liaison officer will be responsible for non-governmental organization contacts as well as keeping track of contacts with Member States related to the identification and deployment of observers. In order to support the activities of the Joint Operations Unit at the regional level, there will be one logistics officer attached to each of the regional offices. As in the case of the electoral officers, they will be under the coordination and guidance of the Regional Coordinator and related functionally to the Joint Operations Unit.

C. Observers on election day

86. South Africans have high expectations regarding the number of international electoral observers anticipated for the elections. This was brought to the attention of my Special Representative in almost all of his interviews. The range in the number of requested observers is very wide. Some groups, based on the number of observers that were present in Namibia (1,758 electoral and 1,035 police observers supervised 358 polling stations), have requested the presence of 25,000 to 30,000 observers. Some sectors have requested the presence of at least one observer for each polling station, which would entail a minimum of 10,000 observers, while others have asked for numbers ranging between 5,000 and 7,000 observers.

87. Most of the requests referred to observers who would arrive shortly before election day, as the proximity of election day places a clear limitation on the number of long-term observers that can be usefully incorporated into UNOMSA in a limited time. However, the experience of the United Nations since Namibia clearly indicates that long-term observers who follow the electoral campaign and establish relevant networks of contacts are far more useful and influential than those who arrive just a few days before the elections and concentrate their attention on the closing episodes of the campaign and on the events of the voting days. Furthermore, as I have pointed out in previous reports, additional observers - or resources - cannot compensate for a possible lack of political will of the competing parties or for attempted sabotage of the process by non-participating groups.

88. It will not be difficult to identify a very large number of observers for the election, as a large number of Member States have closely followed the negotiation process in South Africa. However, other than the limited usefulness of observers concentrating on election day events, there are several practical

considerations in calculating the necessary number of observers. The larger the number of observers, the greater the time and resources required for planning their arrival and deployment. And as the limited resources of the Joint Operational Unit can be easily overwhelmed, a large part of the preparatory work could fall on the long-term observers who will be following the campaign and monitoring violence. Given the special importance attached to their work, such changed emphasis would constitute a misuse of resources.

89. For these reasons I have proposed the use of a combination of earlier approaches, using mobile teams to cover a certain number of polling stations in those areas with low expectations of violence and one observer in each polling station in those areas with a history of violence.

90. The number of required observers, as estimated by the survey mission team, is based on several assumptions:

(a) That the number of polling stations, presently estimated at 7,880 on the basis of demographic information, will increase by 20 per cent after adjustments based on more detailed physical evaluation of sites and consultations with the political parties;

(b) That approximately 40 per cent of the polling stations will be located in non-violent rural milieus. Based on the experience of mobile teams in previous missions, a mobile team of two observers should be able to effectively cover 4 to 10 polling stations on each polling day;

(c) That approximately 50 per cent of the polling stations will be located in non-violent urban and semi-urban areas, and that mobile teams of two observers should be able to adequately cover 14 to 20 polling stations per polling day;

(d) That 10 per cent of the polling stations will be located in areas with a history of violence, and that one observer will be placed in each of them;

(e) That counting will be conducted at counting stations and will start the morning after the elections so that observers who have followed the voting will also be able to monitor counting (without requiring any additional observers to monitor the count);

(f) That a 10 per cent reserve will be sufficient to cover unforeseen requirements and other complementary activities related to the observation.

91. The total number of observers required on the basis of previous assumptions is 2,840. This number refers to the subset of international observers that will function under a joint operational approach. The total number of international observers, including those representing foreign non-governmental organizations and other groups, will be much larger and will probably exceed 5,000. Although there will be close liaison with the non-governmental organizations, their large number and heterogeneity will make it impossible to establish the same kind of coordination.

92. The core observer group of 2,840 will comprise 50 observers from OAU, 322 from EU, and 70 from the Commonwealth. Observers from three other sources will be integrated into the joint group: observers provided by some Member States, over and above those covered by the United Nations budget; observers from developing countries financed through the Trust Fund proposed above; and members of the diplomatic community, particularly the surrounding African countries, who participate in the observation process. If a conservative estimate of 600 observers from these sources is introduced, then the total number of observers to be provided by the United Nations is 1,778. As there will already be 500 United Nations observers, the additional number to be fielded for the last phase is 1,278.

93. Although these estimates are as realistic as possible based on the information available, there may be subsequent changes in the electoral organization procedures (for example, the number of polling stations, the counting immediately after the close of polls and the number of election days) or in the spread of violence, which could affect the numbers required. If so, I intend to resort to the three other intergovernmental organizations and to Member States to provide additional observers or to make additional contributions to the Trust Fund described above. Only if that proves impossible will I request the competent organs to authorize an additional number of observers.

D. Other resource requirements

94. All vehicles used by the mission are rented locally, and the experience with this arrangement has been very favourable. Considering that the rental agencies have confirmed their ability to meet the mission's entire vehicle requirements during the election, it is foreseen that all sedan-type vehicles will be rented locally. Difficulties may arise in obtaining suitable dirt-road vehicles, as they are in short supply at the car rental agencies and the time remaining to effect international purchases is too short. While it would be desirable to provide at least 10 per cent of the mobile election teams with this type of vehicle, at this stage this may prove impossible. Air transport will be provided on a rental basis as required.

95. A functional communications network is of vital importance for the effective execution of the observation and poll-monitoring duties. Therefore, particular attention must be given to the timely establishment of a reliable and responsive communications system throughout South Africa. The survey team found that communications systems in South Africa are, as expected, of a very high technical standard and are available in most parts of the country, although their coverage in rural areas and in the vast squatter camp areas on the outskirts of the big cities is unsatisfactory.

96. Owing to the size of the country and the very short time remaining, it is not deemed feasible to establish the usual independent, country-wide, high-technology United Nations communications network. Even if very substantial financial commitments were entered into, the resulting network would, in all likelihood, be of marginal quality. Future efforts will be geared towards the determination of appropriate local solutions to establish suitable means of

communication. In traditionally non-violent areas, local telephone and pager networks will be utilized as far as possible. In areas with a history of violence, efforts will be made to establish independent, direct, two-way communication systems. They will be coordinated by a Senior Communications Officer who will supervise a team of technicians to be deployed as soon as possible.

Notes

1/ S/24389.

2/ S/25004.

3/ S/26785.

4/ S/26883.

5/ S/26884.

6/ S/26558.

7/ S/25315 and S/26559.

8/ S/25004, para. 47.